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Current Problems of Social Europe* 
 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos** 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The main difficulty of Theology lies in the fact that the very existence of its subject-matter, 
God, may be put into question. Talking about Social Europe has something of a theological 
dimension. The aim of this article is to contribute into the debate, by putting into perspective 
some of the latest manifestations of social Europe. 
The need for the pursuance of social policies at the European level is now more pressing than 
ever (para 2). The EU, however, as it now stands, is the direct evolutionary result of the 
predominantly economic entity created back in 1957. This explains that the social policies 
pursued at the European level are piecemeal and often impregnated with market concerns 
(para. 3). From an instrumental point of view, EU social policy is being pursued concomitantly 
by secondary legislation (hard law) in the fields where the EU does have the relevant 
competences and by softer means of cooperation (soft law) in several other fields. Hard law 
has given the occasion to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in a series of recent 
judgments, of putting to the fore the concept of a ‘social market’ (para. 4). Soft cooperation 
has been formalised into the infamous Lisbon Strategy and has been the main object of 
experimentation with the open method of coordination (OMC) (para. 5). The advances 
achieved in the above ways, however, do not offer firm answers to basic questions 
concerning the future development of the European social identity (para. 6) 
 
2. Social policy – why now? 
 
2.1. In general about social policy 
 
For the purposes of the present analysis, we may use the very simple idea that social policy is 
the use of political power to achieve results which the economic system would not achieve on 
its own, guided by non-market values. Social policy actions may be preventive or corrective. 
Modern social policy has been developed in an effort to counter the effects of industrialisation. 
It is aimed at correcting market failures in the redistribution of wealth, in order to avoid 
extreme cases of poverty and exclusion. This is why social policy is usually thought of as 
being ‘market correcting’. Since social policy is aimed at correcting market failures, it may 
neither follow market values, nor be administered according to market mechanisms.  
Social policy is governed by solidarity. Solidarity is both a guiding principle and a means of 
organising and running the various aspects of social policy. Solidarity may only exist between 
members of a group which share some basic characteristics, history, identity features, 
interests, or at least, sympathy. Historically, social policy has developed in the framework of 
national States and in tandem with them. 
Contrary to God, social policy is not one and indivisible; rather it recovers various distinct 
policies. The policies through which social policy materialises are mainly: a) healthcare for all, 
organised on a universal access basis, b) pensions for the elderly, the incapacitated etc, c) 
allowances for the unemployed, the underpaid, the young, families with many children etc, d) 
subsidised housing for several categories of the population, e) education, aiming to eliminate 
cultural gaps and to prepare a better qualified workforce, f) employment policies, aiming either 
to foster employment or to compensate for employment insecurity and instability, or both, g) 
other policies.  
                                                          
* Based on a paper delivered in the ‘From Rome to Berlin’ conference, commemorating the 50 years of the 
Treaty of Rome, organized by the Centro de Estudios Politcos y Constitutionales – CEPC, Madrid, in June 17, 
2007. 
** Assistant Professor at the Democritus University of Thrace (Greece), Visiting Professor at the College of 
Europe, Bruges (Belgium), Attorney-at-Law – Member of the Athens Bar. DRAFT Comments welcome at 
vasshatz@socadm.duth.gr 
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2.2. The founding Treaties are silent 
 
The founding Treaties of the EEC were silent on all the above policies. Public health only 
appeared as a ground for exception from the basic market freedoms, while pensions were 
marginally touched by Regulation 1408/71, 1 only to the extent necessary to secure the free 
movement of workers. The only aspect of the founding Treaties which had a pronounced 
social character was the objective of free movement of workers – an employment policy, 
allowing offer to meet demand. Further, the French pressure for more general EC powers in 
the social field, resulted in the inclusion of Article 119 EC, securing gender equality. This was 
important for France, since female employment was already higher and on more favourable 
terms than in any other founding State and the French were worried that the single market 
could force them to lower their protection standards.  
Two economic arguments had been used, at the time of the Treaty negotiations, in order to 
justify the lack of strong social commitments in the Treaty. First, the so called ‘Spaak Report’ 
of 1956, specifically drafted for the purposes of the EEC, supported the view that 
harmonisation in the social field would ensue from – and should not come as a precondition of 
– the single market. In parallel, the 1956 ‘Ohlin Report’ prepared under the auspices of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), explained that national exchange rates reflect 
productivity and, hence, offset the advantages of low-wage States. Therefore, States with 
higher levels of social protection and higher wages should not fear competition from low cost 
countries. This explains the fact that Articles 117 and 118 EC are ‘soft’ in nature, while the 
‘hard’ Articles 119 and 120 EC have a limited scope.  
However, despite this apparent disdain of the founding fathers for social issues, the 
Commission in its very first General Report on the activities of the Community, back in 1958, 
stated with remarkable foresight that ‘in the future the Community will be judged by a large 
part of public opinion on the basis of its direct and indirect success in the social field’.2 
 
2.2. The current conjecture requires the EU to unfold some basic social policies 
 
The above statement by the Commission is now more accurate than ever. The debates 
leading to the near-annihilation of the services Directive3 and to the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty have shown that if the EU is to gain credibility and support from its 
citizens, it needs to deliver in the social field. Several factors, which did not exist back in 
1957, currently require the EU to take action in the social field.  
First, at a macro level, the economies of member States have constantly evolved together 
since 1957, and even more so since the setting up of (the conditions for) the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), after 1992. Together with the economies, the social realities and 
challenges of member States have been brought closer. This movement has been 
strengthened by the globalisation of the economy, on the one hand, and by the creation and 
strengthening of European-wide trade-unions, on the other. This de facto bringing together 
makes common action in the social field more plausible, despite the fundamental differences 
existing between the social systems of member States.  
Second, under the current conditions of EMU, regulatory competition and the risk of race to 
the bottom concerning the level of social protection offered, is more present than ever. From 
an economic point of view, member States have lost command of demand side policies 
through which they could deal with unfavorable economic conjectures. First, the budgetary 
restrictions imposed by the convergence criteria of the Euro and the Stability and Growth 
                                                          
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community. 
This Regulation has been modified at least thirty times, the last important modification extending its personal 
scope to cover nationals of non Member States legally residing within the EU, see Council Regulation (EC) 
859/2003 of 14 May 2003, OJ L 124/1. It has recently been codified and repealed by Regulation (EC) 
883/2004 of 29 April 2004, OJ L 166/1. 
2 Para. 103. 
3 Directive 2006/123/EC, [2006] OJ L 376/36; See between many on this issue, V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Qu’est-ce qui 
reste de la Directive sur les services’ (2007) CDE, forthcoming, already available at 
http://www.coleurop.be/template.asp?pagename=lawpapers ; see U. Do, ‘La proposition de directive relative 
aux services dans le marché intérieur… définitivement hors service?’, (2006) RDUE, 111 et seq. 
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Pact4 do not allow for any systematic policy of public investment. Further, the existence of a 
single currency and its management by the European Central Bank exclude any form of 
monetary and interest rate policies, aiming at the reinforcement of national competitiveness. 
Moreover, the Ohlin argument, according to which lower productivity is reflected in (and offset 
by) lower currency exchange rates, is no more valid for the Euro countries. Consequently, the 
only way for member States to face negative economic conjunctures and/or increase 
competitiveness, is through the adoption of supply side policies: stimulate productivity through 
the creation of a favorable business environment.5 Cutting down on red tape and ensuring a 
user-friendly regulatory environment,6 could be part of such a policy. Further, States may be 
tempted to reduce the unitary costs of production, through the reduction of welfare costs 
and/or the protection of workers. In conditions of extended economic recession, as the 
present one, the danger exists that member States engage in ‘negative competition’ (race to 
the bottom) in an effort to ensure a competitive advantage, bringing about a substantial blow 
to the ‘European social model’ 7,8. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that, now more than in 
the past, ‘it pays’ for member States to openly or covertly cheat on their partners over 
‘common’ policies, be it for a limited period of time.9 In order to avoid such a development, or 
                                                          
4 See J. V. Louis, ‘The Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact’ (2006) CMLRev 85-106; F. Mariatte, 
Procédures pour déficits publics excessifs et mise en œuvre du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance : match 
nul, balle au centre ?, Europe (10/2004) 25-29 ; and before that V. Hatzopoulos, The Stability and Growth 
Pact Five Years Later: Cornerstone or Trammel for the EMU? Droits de l’Homme (16/2002) 1069-1080. 
5 For an in depth analysis of the issue see F. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the 
Challenges of Diversity, JCMS  (4/2002) 645-670.  
6 Which is based on simplification of the various administrative procedures, reduction of red tape and, more 
generally, substantial regulatory reform. Such initiatives are supported both by the OECD and by the EC, in 
the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, see infra para. 5.  
7 If we accept that such a thing does exist. The term was first used by the EC Commission in its White Paper 
European Social Policy – A way Forward for the Union (COM 1994/333 final) under the instigation of its then 
President J. Delors. See also, Defending the European Model of Society, in Commission of the European 
Communities, DG V, Combating Social Exclusion, Fostering  Integration, Brussels  (1992) 49, where this 
model is defined through a mixed economy with the participation of all citizens, where market forces are 
combined with government and social dialogue. The 2003 Greek Presidency called an International 
Conference on «The modernization of the European Social Model», which led to the publication of a lengthy 
general report entitled Connecting Welfare Diversity Within the European Social Model, published by 
Intersentia (2004). In the same vain see F. Sharpf, The European Social Model… (supra n. 5) and J. Shaw, A 
Strong Europe is a Social Europe, Federal Trust online paper 05/03, available at 
http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/eu_constitution. Righters such as E. Mossialos and M. McKee, EU Law and the 
Social Character of Health Care, PIE Peter Lang (2002) 27-41 and, more recently, D. Wincott, The Idea of the 
European Social Model: Limits and Paradoxes of Europeanization, in K. Featherstone & C. Radaelli (eds) The 
Politics of Europeanization, Oxford (2003) ch. 12, after seriously questioning the existence of a European 
social model, have answered in the affirmative. In recent years some writers have raised the issue of the 
externalities produced by the European social model, see e.g. A. Lindbeck, The European Social Model: 
Lessons for Developing Countries, Economics and Research Department, Asian and Development Bank, 
Working Paper series n. 11, available at www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_Papers/wp011.pdf and W. 
Busse & A. Hemerijck, Deepening Social Europe in an Enlarged Union, available at 
www.fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKALANALYSE/wwHemerijck.pdf .  
   However the very existence of a (single) social model has been questioned by many writers in view of a) the 
considerable divergences in the social stratification and the organisation of the social services in member 
states, see e.g. McKee, Mossialos  above and b) the secondary role that social matters play in the EU’s 
common policies, see e.g. Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?, EUI 
Working Paper 2004/8  and Ch. Joerges, The Market Without the State? The ‘Economic Constitution’ of the 
EC and the Rebirth of Regulatory Politics, European Integration Online Papers (EIOP) 1997/19. The debate is 
still open, both at the academic and at the political level: see the two most recent contributions by L. Mullally & 
N. O’Brien (eds), Beyond the Social Europe, (2006) Open Europe, available online at 
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/pressrelease.aspx?pressreleaseid=14 and P.N. Rasmussen & J. 
Delors, The New Social Europe, (2007) Party of European Socialists available at 
http://www.pes.org/content/view/262/138. 
8 The same logic of preventing a ‘race to the bottom’ has prevailed during the negotiation of the founding 
Treaties, at a time when France recognized more extensive social rights to workers than the other founding 
states. Thus, in Article 117 EEC (Treaty of Rome numbering), the member states identify the necessity and 
recognize the possibility that the common market may lead to the approximation of their respective social 
security systems, see C. Barnard, EC Social Policy in  P. Craig and  G. de Burca (eds),  The  Evolution  of  EU  
Law,  OUP (1999) 479-516, 481. 
9 Member States are tempted to maintain what they consider to be their ‘competitive advantage’ for as long as 
possible, at the cost of ignoring common policies. The derogations negotiated and the violations inflicted to the 
common rules opening up the utilities markets, offer a good illustration of the above point. The persistence of 
several states in violating the Stability and Growth pact, offers yet another very strong illustration. This point 
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at least organize it in a rational and coordinated way, this decade presents the challenge of 
formulating common directions of social policy into an unswerving necessity for the EU. 
Third, in view of the persisting high unemployment in the whole of the European economic 
space, the EU has devised its own employment policy (EES, 1997), later completed by the 
Lisbon strategy (2000). Both strategies are aimed at the goal of a highly skilled, highly 
productive and high-wage economy. By the same token, 3D (dirty, dangerous, degrading) 
employments are to be reformed and/or abandoned. These objectives have led the EU both 
at some harmonization and at some substantial coordination between national employment 
policies. 
Fourth, in this last decade one of the aims pursued by both the legislature and the judiciary is 
that of fostering European citizenship.10 Directive 2004/38/EC (the citizenship Directive),11 
which modifies the basic Regulation (EC) 1612/68 and replaces no less than nine directives, 
thus consolidating the status of European citizens is only an example. Directive 2005/63/EC12 
on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and experience is yet another 
example. A further example is to be found in Directive 2003/109/EC13 on long term residents 
from third countries, instituting what several writers have called the ‘civic citizenship’. The 
judiciary, from its part, has taken the boldest steps during these last years to flesh up and 
strengthen European citizenship.14 Citizenship is not only about civil and political rights, but 
also – and to a large extent – about social rights.  
Fifth, all the above arguments become more pressing after the recent twelve-strong 
enlargement of the EU. 
All these reasons call for a stronger involvement of the EU in the social field. They may all be 
summed up by the need for the EU to gain in acceptability and support among European 
citizens, a condition necessary for any further step in the European integration project.  
 
3. Aspects of a European social policy 
 
3.1. Mapping European social policy 
 
All the above do not suggest that the EU has been completely idle in the field of social policy 
and that it now has to start from scratch. Quite to the contrary, the first actions of the EU in 
the social field date almost as far back as the creation of the EEC itself. Ever since, the social 
action of the EU has diversified and increased. However, such action has been sporadic and 
ill-coordinated, if at all. As a consequence of the lack of a general legal basis in the EC/EU 
Treaty, action at the European level has had to develop in a piecemeal way. With retrospect 
we may acknowledge that, well before terms such as ‘active social policies’, ‘employability’ 
and ‘flexicurity’ were invented, many of the ‘social’ actions of the EC/EU did in fact pursue 
such objectives.  
a) The single most important social policy of the EC has been securing the free movement of 
workers, then European citizens, within the EC territory. This has been pursued by hefty and 
complicated legislation (think of all the directives and regulations repealed by the recent 
‘citizenship Directive’, of Regulation 1408/71 and its numerous amendments leading to the 
codifying Regulation 883/200415 and of the ‘General Systems’ for the mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications codified in Directive 2005/63) and by even heftier case law of the 
ECJ.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
has been excellently made by S. Collignon in his oral presentation in the CEPS commemorative conference 
for the 50 years of the Treaty of Rome, ‘From Rome to Berlin’, Madrid, 19-20 juin 2007.  
10 For the most recent and fuller account of the issues relating to European citizenship see J. Shaw, The 
Transformation of Citizenship in the EU, CUP (2007) Cambridge; see also F. Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the EU – 
A Legal Analysis’ (2007) ELJ 591-610, as well as all the other articles of this same issue of the ELJ exclusively 
dedicated to the issue of citizenship.  
11 Directive 2004/38/ΕC of the EP and the Council of 29 April 2004, [2004] OJ L 158/77. 
12 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications, [2005] OJ 255/22. 
13 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who 
are long-term residents [2003] OJ L 16/44. 
14 See n. 10 above and the developments below para. 4. 
15 Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of the EP and the Council of 29 April 2004 [2004] OJ L 166/1.  
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b) Following the Court’s judgments in Defrenne,16 the objective of gender equality has entered 
the EC agenda. This has been pursued by Directives 75/117 on equal pay17 and 76/207 on 
equal access to employment and working conditions.18 Only in 2000 has the principle of non 
discrimination overcome this narrow framework of analysis, to cover discrimination based on 
other criteria (race, religion, handicap, age, sexual orientation),19 and to expand in fields other 
than employment.20 Even today, however, discrimination on the basis of nationality (for third 
country nationals) is not prohibited under EU law. 
c) Further in the field of employment, the EC has strived to secure minimum health and 
security regulations.21 More controversially, the EC has also managed to regulate working 
time within the Member States.22 
 d) Moreover, the EU has put into place some own initiatives (as opposed to the EES, which 
consists of the coordination of national employment policies) for the promotion of 
employment. In this respect, the creation of the European Employment Service (EURES), 
centralizing all existing employment offer and demand, has been one of the core measures. 
These have been completed by programmes, such as ERGO, ADAPT, STAGE etc, for the 
promotion of employment at the member State level. 
e) These initiatives have been complemented by measures on education and training. The 
creation of the European Centre for Training (Centre Europeen de Formation Professionnelle, 
CEDEFOP) and the financing of programmes such as SOCRATES with its sub-programmes 
Erasmus, Lingua, Leonardo etc are some of the most important initiatives in this field. 
f) The only EU action in the social field, which is only indirectly and vaguely connected to 
employment, is the European social cohesion policy. Social cohesion between the various 
regions of the EU is mainly pursued through the European Social Fund (ESF) which finances 
projects in the regions coming under the three objectives defined by Regulation (EC) 
1260/99.23 The European Investment Bank further finances or guarantees loans for the 
development of these same regions. Further, programmes such as URBAN, EQUAL etc may 
be used to bridge regional disparities.  
The image would not be complete without a mention of the EU’s regional and industrial 
policies.  
This brief overview of the main EU’s actions in the social field leads to two observations. First, 
that EU actions come as the manifestations of different, often unrelated, EU policies. 
Therefore, the issue of coordination is key. Second, that social policies pursued at the EU 
level are rarely exclusively ‘market correcting’, but tend to be essentially ‘market making’ or at 
least ‘market enhancing’.24 Both these characteristics may be due to the limited nature of EU 
competences in the social field and to the efforts of the EU to expand in the social field 
indirectly, through recourse to other more ‘economic’ policies in which its competences are 
undisputed.  
A closer look at the content of the EU’s social policy shows that the objectives pursued are, in 
order: a) creating a level playing field for national markets to integrate, b) promote 
employment and c) combat social exclusion. This is due a) to the particular (functional) 
                                                          
16 Cases 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455 and C-149/77 Defrenne III [1978] ECR 1365.  
17 Directive 75/117/EEC of the Council of 10 February 1975 [1975] OJ L 45/19. 
18 Directive 76/207/EEC of the Council of 9 February 1976 [1976] OJ L 39/40; this latter directive has recently 
been modified by directive 2002/73/EC of the EP and the Council of 23 September 2002 [2002] OJ L 269/15 
19 Directive 2000/78/EC of the Council of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
20 Directive 2000/43/ΕC of the Council of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22. 
21 See e.g. Council Directives 89/654/EEC on safety at the workplace (1989) OJ L 393/1, 89/655/EEC on 
safety of work equipment (1989) L 393/13, 90/270/EEC on safety of VDUs (1990) OJ L 156/14, 90/269/EEC 
on manual handling of loads (1990) OJ L 156/14. 
22 Directive 93/104/EC [1993] OJ L 307/18, later repealed and replaced by Directive 2003/88/EC [2003] OJ L 
299/9. 
23 Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural 
Funds (1999) OJ L 161/1; according to this Regulation, the three objectives are as follows: ‘Objective 1: 
promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind’, 
‘Objective 2:  supporting the economic and social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties’ and 
‘Objective 3: supporting the adaptation and modernisation of policies and systems of education, training and 
employment’; see also Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 of the EP and of the Council of 12 July 1999 on the 
European Social Fund, (1999) OJ L 213/5.  
24 For the use of this terminology see C. Barnard, EC Social Policy, above n. 8. 
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properties of the European integration project, b) to the principle of the attribution of powers 
and c) to the lack of an ideological background, in the form of a Treaty preamble, a 
declaration etc, on which EU social policy could be based. This latter point was partly, but 
inadequately, addressed by the adoption of the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights. This, however, was not a binding text and was further weakened by the UK’s 
initial refusal to sign it.25 The European Charter of Fundamental Rights, jointly proclaimed by 
the EU Institutions in 2000, could have remedied this vacuum, but at the insistence of several 
member States this also was non-binding. The introduction of the Charter in the Constitutional 
Treaty has been self-defeating, since it was one of the main reasons for the British opposition. 
Similarly, the Reform Treaty negotiations could only get started after the UK obtained that the 
Charter be only annexed to it, without binding (or else direct) effects. 
 
3.2. European social policy from a regulatory perspective 
 
Against this background it becomes crucial to analyse the EU’s ‘social policy’ from a 
regulatory viewpoint. Two distinctions may be drawn. From the viewpoint of the means used, 
some EU actions take the form of hard law instruments, while others are only put forward 
through funding programmes or soft coordination. From the viewpoint of the objective 
pursued, some EU initiatives aim at creating proper EU social policy, which adds up to that of 
member States, while other initiatives are restricted to coordinating national social policies. It 
is true that most measures of hard law tend to create new social norms, while soft law is 
mostly used for coordination purposes, but the two distinctions do not fit perfectly.  
If the above distinction is applied to the fields of EU social policy identified above (in para. 3.1) 
a broad – and imperfect – dichotomy may be drawn. On the one hand, the EU is pursuing its 
own social agenda in the fields of a) free movement of workers, b) safety and security in the 
working place and c) non discrimination. On the other hand, the EU is striving to coordinate 
national policies in the areas of a) employment, b) training and education and c) social 
cohesion. This broad distinction is only approximate, since hard and soft law are not mutually 
exclusive and that EU policies are often accompanied by coordination of national ones. 
However, this imperfect distinction may serve for making out the main actors and identifying 
the key challenges in the development of the EU’s social policy. Indeed, hard law has 
received a new light by the late activism of the ECJ, in the direction of securing social rights 
(para. 4 below). Soft law, on its part, has been offering increasingly credible solutions and has 
been attracting attention, since the launch and the formalization of the Open Method(s) of 
Coordination (para. 5 below).  
 
4. Social Market? The role of the Court 
 
The ECJ has shown social awareness in many fields of EU law. Starting with the Defrenne 
judgments, the ECJ developed a rich body of case law concerning a) gender equality,26 b) the 
equitable application of Regulation 1408/71 on the mobility of pension and healthcare 
rights,27c) the application of Directive 80/98728 on the protection of employees in the event of 
insolvency of their employer,29 d) equal terms of access in education, training and relative 
benefits30 etc. However, in the recent case law of the ECJ we can distinguish three trends, 
which clearly illustrate the irresistible evolution of the internal market from a purely economic 
                                                          
25 The UK signed the Charter only after the election of the labour government in 1998. 
26 For the abundant case law on this issue see, among many, T. Hervey & D. O’Keeffe (eds), Sex Equality 
Law in the EU, Wiley Chancery (1996) as well as H. Fenwick & T. Hervey, Sex Equality in the Single Market: 
New Directions for the ECJ, CMLRev (1995) 433, J. Shaw, Women, Work and Care: Women’s Dual Role and 
Double Burden in EC Sex Equality Law, Journal of European Social Policy (1998) 43-63, G. More, The 
Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?, in P. Craig & G. de Burca, (eds) 
The Evolution of EU Law (1999) OUP 517-553. See also V. Hatzopoulos, La protection des minorités 
sexuelles par les juridictions européennes, Revue Hellénique des Droits de l’Homme (15/2002) 709-756. 
27 See e.g. Cases 182/78 Pierrik II [1979] ECR 1977, C-120/95 Decker [1998] ECR I-1831, C-158/96 Kohll 
[1998] ECR Ι-1931 and many more; see below under 2.1.3. 
28 Directive 80/987/EEC [1980] OJ L 283/23. 
29 See e.g. cases C-6 & 9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357 and C-479/93 Francovich II [1995] ECR Ι-3843 
and more recently case C-520/03 Olaso Valero [2004] ECR I-12065. 
30 Starting with judgments of the Court in cases 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593 and 24/86 Blaizot [1998] ECR 
379 and culminating in cases C-224/98 D’Hoop  [2002] ECR I-6191 and C-209/03 Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119. 
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area to one where the law takes into account the social parameters of the unifying process: 
the complete abolition of reverse discrimination in the free movement of persons (4.1), the 
enhanced portability of health care rights (4.2) and the full recognition of professional 
qualifications (4.3). These developments have made several writers wonder whether the 
internal market prescribed by the Treaty is not a ‘social market’.31 
 
4.1. Direct effect of the European citizenship and the abolition of reverse discrimination 
 
The introduction of the European citizenship by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was faced 
with circumspection by many writers. The main criticism expressed was that the ‘rights’ 
attached to citizenship added nothing to the already existing ‘acquis’ in relation to the free 
movement of persons.32 Such criticisms were nourished by the early case law of the ECJ 
itself.33 However, in a series of recent judgments the ECJ re-powered citizenship, by 
recognizing that the relevant EC provisions grant EU citizens autonomous rights, 
independently from the Treaty freedoms on free movement. Rights accruing from citizenship, 
as it were, by hypothesis embody the social principle. Hence, the direct application of the 
Treaty provisions on citizenship entails the generalization of the principle of equal treatment 
and the abolition of reverse discrimination (4.1.1), leads to the consecration, under EU law, of 
the fundamental right to family life (4.1.2) and goes as far as the recognition of rights of a 
purely social nature, such as access to the welfare system of other member states (4.1.3). 
 
4.1.1. Abolition of reverse discriminations  
 
The case law of ECJ according to which EU law only applies to situations where some cross-
border element is present and does not cover reverse discrimination, has been extensively 
commented upon.34 The institution, by the Treaty of Maastricht, of the European citizenship, 
has been instrumental in gradually restricting – and eventually eliminating – the scope of 
reverse discriminations.  
The ECJ made the first step towards recognizing the possibility for a national of a member 
State to invoke EU rights against his/her own State, in Surinder Singh.35 Despite the fact that 
Mr. Singh, of Indian nationality, did not have a residence right under the British legislation, the 
Court held that he drew such a right from Directive 73/148,36 under his capacity as the spouse 
of an EU worker previously established in another member State. The far-reaching effects of 
this judgment have been identified by many writers,37 but did not materialize until ten years 
later, in Carpenter.38 In this case right of residence in the UK was claimed in favor of the 
                                                          
31 See M. Poires Maduro ‘Europe’s Social Self: ‘The Sickness unto Death’ (2/2000) Constitutional web paper, 
available at http://les1.man.ac.uk/con w eb/; Ch. Joerges, ‘Social Market Economy as Europe’s Social Model?’ 
(2004/8) EUI Working Paper Law; for a more general and extensive discussion of the underlying issues see J. 
Baquero-Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement, The Economic Constitutional Law of the European 
Community (2002) Hart Publishing, Portland. 
32 See among many J. Weiler, Citizenship and Human Rights, in J. Winter e.a. (eds) Reforming the TEU: The 
Legal Debate, Kluwer (1996). 
33 Cases C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-6207 and C-356/98 Kaba I [2000] ECR I-2623.   
34 N. Shuibhne, ‘Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to move on?’ (2002) CMLrev  
731-771; G. Gaja, Les discriminations à rebours : un revirement souhaitable, in Mélanges en hommage à 
Michel Waelbroeck, Vol. II, Bruylant, Bruxelles (1999) 993-1000 and H. Tagaras, Règles Communautaires de 
libre circulation, discriminations à rebours et situations dites ‘purement internes’ , in the same Mélanges, 1499-
1538. See also, D. Simon & F. Lagondet, Libre circulation des marchandises et situations purement internes: 
chronique d’une mort annoncée, Europe (1997), chron. 9; A. Canizzaro, Producing “Reverse Discrimination” 
through the Exercise of EC Competences, YEL (1997), A. Somek, Reverse Discrimination Revisited, Coping 
with Incongruity between Community Law and Member State Legislation, at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/juridicum/forschung/wp09.pdf  
35 Case C-370/90 Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-4265. 
36 Directive 73/148/EEC of the Council of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision 
of services [1973] OJ L 172/14. This directive, together with numerous other acts of secondary legislation 
concerning the freedom of movement and of establishment of community workers has been recently repealed 
and replaced by directive 2004/38/ΕC of the EP and the Council of 29 April 2004, ‘the citizenship directive’ 
[2004] OJ L 158/77. 
37 See e.g. R. White in ELRev (1993) 527-532 and H. Cullen in The Journal of Social Welfare Law (1993) 77-
82. 
38 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] I-6279. 
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Filipino spouse of a British citizen who lived normally within the UK and offered services, 
some of which had addressees in other member States. The ECJ found the British citizen to 
be a ‘service provider’ in the sense of Article 49 EC. Hence, he was entitled under EU law to 
claim for his spouse a right of residence in the State were he was established, even if this 
were his own State of origin. In order to reach this conclusion the ECJ expressly referred itself 
to article of 8 ECHR, on family life, which it elevated to the status of a general principle of EU 
law.39 This reference to the ECHR together with the (well established) extensive interpretation 
of the notion of services to include cross-border flows which are only potential,40 opens up the 
possibility of invoking the internal market rules as against one’s own state of origin, in a 
virtually unlimited number of cases.   
This tendency in the case law of the ECJ is being confirmed by the judgment of the Court in 
D'Hoop, delivered the same day with Carpenter.  
It stems from the above case law that, at least as far as ‘personal freedoms’ (i.e. free 
movement of persons and services) are concerned, the European citizenship henceforth 
prohibits reverse discriminations.41  
 
4.1.2. A fundamental right to family life 
 
The ECJ has steadily lent its support to family life, through an extensive interpretation of the 
rights and privileges recognized by the EC legislation to family members (right of residence, 
work, equal treatment, social protection etc). Thus the Court has held that the widow of a 
Community worker maintains her social entitlements even after the death of her spouse.42 
Moreover, the separated (yet not divorced) spouse of an European worker retains her right of 
stay in the member State of their common residence.43 Further, the ECJ has held that, 
although unmarried couples do not constitute a family in the sense of the Treaty, the 
unmarried companion of an EU national may follow him/her in another member State, if this 
latter State recognizes legal effects to free partnerships.44  
Further, the Court has recognized that family members of an EU citizen hold rights from 
him/her, even though the citizen in question a) has interrupted relations with his/her family, b) 
has moved to a third State outside the EU or c) is not or has never been a worker. In 
Baumbast the ECJ held i.a. that a) the German ex-worker who had moved to a third State 
could not claim any right of stay for him and his family in another member State under any 
specific rule of primary or secondary legislation, but could do so in his quality as an EU 
citizen, under Article 18 EC. Further, the ECJ held that b) children under the age of 18 who 
were enrolled in the educational system of a member State, where one of their parents was 
legally established, enjoy an autonomous right of stay until the end of their education, 
vocational training etc. Finally c) the ECJ found that the parent who is responsible for the 
child(ren) has a right of stay linked to that of the child(ren), which is completely independent 
from the nationality of both the parent in question and of the child(ren).45 In order to reach the 
above conclusions the ECJ referred itself not only to Article 18 EC, but also, complementarily, 
to Article 8 ECHR on the right to a family life. This is, however, an extensive interpretation of 
the right to a family life, since rights of residence of family members a) may last longer than 
the family itself (in case of divorce), b) may overpass the duration of employment – or even 
                                                          
39 See recit. 41 and 42 of the judgment, as well as the judgment of the Court in D’Hoop, above n. 30. See also 
cases C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, C-200/02 Zhu & Chen [2004] nyr.  
40 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR Ι-1141 and its annotation by V. Hatzopoulos in CMLRev 
(1995) 1427-1445. 
41 The same tendency, albeit in a more reserved way, is also to be observed in the case law of the ECJ in 
relation to free movement of goods and capital; see Joined cases C-321 to 324/94 Pistre [1997] ECR I-2343, 
recit. 44 and Case C-448/98 Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663 for goods and Joined cases 515, 519 to 524 and 
526 to 540/99 Reisch e.a. [2002] ECR I-2157 for capitals. For a recent overview of all four freedoms and the 
interactions between them, see V. Hatzopoulos, Trente ans après les arrêts fondamentaux de 1974, les 
quatre libertés: quatre? in P. Demaret e.a. (eds.) 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the College of 
Europe - 30 ans d'études juridiques européennes au Collège d'Europe: Liber Professorum 1973/74-2003/04, 
P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2005. 
42 Case 32/75 Cristini v. SNCF [1975] ECR 1085.  
43 Case 267/83 Diatta [1985] ECR 567.  
44 The ECJ held that the right of residence of the unmarried companion constituted for the EU worker a ‘social 
advantage’ in respect of which any discrimination is prohibited.  
45 These same rights are henceforth recognized by directive 2004/38, the ‘citizenship directive’, above n. 11. 
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residence – of the community national in the member state concerned and c) may acquire 
autonomous character, for a considerable duration.  
More importantly still, in Zhu and Chen the ECJ found that a newly born infant having the 
European citizenship, did have a right of stay in another member State, despite the fact that it 
did not belong to any of the categories of free movement beneficiaries (workers, pensioners 
etc). The Chinese mother, from whom the infant depended, both in practical and sentimental 
terms, also gained a right of stay in the UK. This right is conditional, according to the ECJ, 
upon the beneficiaries not becoming a burden for the welfare and healthcare system of the 
receiving country. In this case this was granted, since a third person, who enjoyed no right 
whatsoever in the UK, i.e. the Chinese father, provided the necessary economic support. The 
judgment in Zhu & Chen is very important in that it marks the emancipation of European 
citizenship and of rights thereby attached, from the exercise of some economic activity. 
Contrary to the situation in Baumbast, where the basic beneficiary was the Community 
worker, from whom family members drew rights, in this case the basic beneficiary is the 
underage child which has the citizenship of a member State, while the alien worker only 
occupies an ‘auxiliary’ role by providing the necessary economic means, without himself 
drawing any right.  
Summarizing the above case law, it can be said that the initial extensive interpretation of the 
rules on the free movement of persons, is gradually giving way and/or is being combined with 
a pro-active application of Article 18 EC, on European citizenship, in order to ensure the 
respect of family life, more extensively than Article 8 ECHR provides for. Hence, Article 18 EC 
acquires important added value for the application of the EC Treaty and ensures minimal 
enforceability to Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
4.1.3. Access to the welfare system of other member states 
 
One of the founding principles of the EC is the abolition of discrimination between nationals of 
the member States, whether based on nationality or on other criteria. However, such a 
general principle does not flow directly from the Treaties. Despite lengthy legislation 
prohibiting various forms of discrimination,46 only the 2000 directives 47 did attempt a 
generalized enactment of the principle of equal treatment. In the meantime, in order to cover 
the relevant legal vacuum, the ECJ, on the one hand recognized the principle of non-
discrimination as a general principle of EC law 48 and, on the other hand, developed a rich 
body of case law defining the scope of the said principle in an extensive manner.49  
A particularly delicate issue is the access of EU nationals to welfare benefits of other member 
States. It is beyond any doubt that the early directives on free movement, as well as the 1990 
directives on the generalization of the right of residence specifically provided against any form 
of ‘social tourism’. This is why the former directives restricted the right of establishment only 
to those in employment (and hence those with resources equal to those of nationals of the 
member state concerned). In the same vain the 1990 directives made the right of stay 
conditional upon the beneficiary having sufficient income and medical insurance, in order for 
him/her not to become a burden for the welfare system of the receiving state. However, the 
gradual recognition of the status of European citizenship as an autonomous source of rights 
was bound to alter this position. 
The first step in this direction was made by the ECJ in Martinez Sala.50 She was Spanish 
legally resident in Germany, but she was refused a school allowance for her daughter, as she 
did not come within any of the categories of equal treatment beneficiaries provided for in EC 
secondary legislation: she was neither a worker any more, nor had she become a pensioner 
yet. The ECJ resorted to a subterfuge whereby, without recognizing that the European 
citizenship could be the source of autonomous rights, it reached an equivalent result. The 
ECJ held that any person who falls ratione personae within the scope of the Treaty, (e.g. 
                                                          
46 See all the directives repealed and replaced by the ‘Citizenship Directive’, as well as Directives 75/117/EEC 
and 76/207/EEC, above n. 17 and 18. 
47 Directive 2000/43/ΕC of the Council of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22 and directive 2000/78/EC of the Council of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] 
OJ L 303/16. 
48 Defrenne II  and mainly Defrenne  III, above n. 16.  
49 See above n. 26. 
50 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala [1988] ECR I-2691.  
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national of a member State legally residing in another member state), is able to invoke the 
rules ratione materiae of the same Treaty (e.g. the principle of non-discrimination and of equal 
access to family – and other social – benefits in the state of reception). 51  
The same distinction was also applied by the ECJ in its judgment in Grzelczyk.52 This case 
concerned a French student residing in Belgium by virtue of Directive 93/36, who was 
claiming the minimal subsistence benefit (minimex). The Court found the Belgian legislation, 
which restricted the subsistence benefit solely to Belgian nationals, to be contrary to Article 12 
EC, on equal treatment. 53 
The Court reiterated – but obliterated – this same distinction, between personal and material 
scope of the Treaty, in its judgment in D'Hoop. This concerned a Belgian girl who had 
completed high school in France, then returned to University in Belgium, where she claimed 
the ‘waiting subsidy’ before her first employment. In this case, the court recognized the direct 
effect of Article 18 EC, and observed that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same 
situation to enjoy within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty the same treatment in law 
irrespective of their nationality’.54 Hence, by applying Article 18 EC the Court recognized to 
the applicant the right to receive the waiting subsidy, in the face of the contrary national 
legislation. 
In the judgment in Collins 55 the Court accepted that a national of a member State, who seeks 
employment in another member State,56 may claim unemployment benefits from that latter 
(host) State. In the UK such benefits were only granted to persons having their usual 
residence within the national territory, i.e. mostly (but not exclusively) British nationals. The 
ECJ found that since Article 48 EC provides for a general right of EU citizens to seek 
employment in other member States, the contested measure did constitute discriminatory 
treatment contrary to Article 12 EC. However, the ECJ was ready to accept that such 
measures may be justified, to the extent that they ensure a genuine link between the 
applicant and the labor market in which he/she strives to integrate, avoiding thus phenomena 
of ‘social tourism’.  
More recently in Bidar57 the Court took a further step, and held that the UK rule which made 
financial aid for maintenance expenses (not for fees) subject to a requirement of a three-year 
prior residence within the country, a discrimination prohibited under Article 12 EC. This finding 
of the Court is of particular significance, since in its 1988 judgments in Brown and Lair 58 the 
Court had found that maintenance grants are outside the scope of Article 12 (then 7) EC. This 
solution had been further crystallized in Article 3 of Directive 93/96 and has been maintained 
in the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 (Art. 24(2)). Therefore in this case the Court refers itself 
to the Treaty provisions on citizenship not merely in order to complete some loophole in the 
secondary legislation, but rather in order to circumvent precise rules of secondary legislation, 
henceforth deemed incompatible with the level of integration achieved. At a later stage of its 
reasoning the Court recognises that a member State may restrict such benefits to students 
who are ‘sufficiently integrated’ in the State in question, but not in a way as to exclude all non-
national students, as the UK measure under review in fact did.   
A similar reasoning was followed by the Court in Trojani.59 This case concerned the refusal of 
a Belgian fund to grant the minimal subsistence benefit (minimex) to a Frenchman who 
worked in a reintegration programme in the Salvation Army in Belgium. The ECJ avoided to 
                                                          
51 Recitals 62-64 of the judgment.   
52 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193.  
53 The ECJ held that the host State has the right not to renew or to recall the authorization of residence if the 
conditions of directive 93/96 – and the requirement of sufficient economic resources in particular – are no 
more fulfilled. However, member states may not proceed to the above actions merely because the person 
concerned has applied for the minimal benefit of subsistence. 
54 D’Hoop recit. 28, where the Court refers itself to recit. 31 of the judgment in case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] 
ECR Ι-6193. 
55 Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703.   
56 That is to say, the person concerned has not yet worked in the host country and hence does not come 
within the scope of Regulation 1612/68, which could entitle him/her to such a benefit.   
57 Case C-209/03 Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119. 
58 Cases 39/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3161 and 197/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3205. 
59 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573.   
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rule on whether this constituted actual and real work, in the sense of articles 39 et seq. EC,60 
but turned to the rights arising from citizenship. The Court held that Article 18 EC constitutes 
some kind of ‘presumption’ in favor of the right of residence in other member States, a right 
which may be restricted in a way respectful of proportionality. However, insofar as the host 
State has not restricted the right of residence of a national of another member State (even if it 
would be proportional to do so),61 this State cannot ignore its obligation to treat equally all EU 
citizens established in its territory. Both the factual situation and the findings of the Court in 
this case are very similar to the ones pertaining in Grzelczyk, Collins and Bidar. What should 
not be overlooked, however, is that in these three cases the applicant drew his right of stay 
within the host member State from a specific provision of the Treaty or of secondary 
legislation. On the other hand, Mr. Trojani, who did not clearly qualify as a worker, held the 
same right of stay directly from Article 18 EC.   
From the above case law it stems that that the principle of equal treatment coupled with the 
rights of citizenship occasionally serve the ECJ as means of ‘positive action’, whereby social 
benefits are being recognized to beneficiaries on a territorial – not a national – basis. In this 
way the Court takes a step forward from negative integration and promotes solutions leading 
to positive integration. Solutions which are not unknown to national social systems62 and 
which have been crystallized, to some extent, in Directive 2003/109 on long term migrants.63 
In this way, equal treatment is more than merely a principle, as it gives rise to concrete 
subjective rights of second (right to a family life) and of third (social benefits) generation. In 
order to reach the above results, the ECJ occasionally refers itself to provisions of the ECHR, 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Social Charter or other texts of 
international law, but always in an incidental way. The core reasoning of the Court is based 
on an extensive interpretation of the fundamental Treaty freedoms, complemented by fully-
fledged citizenship rights and the principle of equal treatment. 
 
4.2. Portability of health rights of EU citizens  
 
In order to make possible the limited movement of capital, at a time where the relevant Treaty 
freedom was completely idle, the ECJ held that payments for services received in another 
member state should be free of any restriction. By the same token the Court recognized that 
medical patients, students and tourists moving to another member State are service 
recipients, in the sense of Article 49 EC, and should be allowed to carry around the necessary 
moneys.64  
In this indirect, almost unconscious, way the ECJ established that healthcare services 
constitute services in the sense of the Treaty.65 This led to spectacular developments in the 
last seven years. This case law, lengthy, highly technical and politically controversial, has 
been presented in detail by several authors and does not find its place here.66 It is reminded, 
                                                          
60 For the relative requirement, see i.a. cases 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035; 196/87 Steyman [1988] ECR 
6159 and 344/87 Bettray  [1989] ECR 1621.  
61 In fact Belgium had issued Mr. Trojani a residence permit. 
62 Both the UK and Belgian legislation did not altogether exclude foreigners from the relevant benefits, but 
imposed extremely restrictive conditions. 
63 Directive 2003/109/EC [2003] OJ L 16/44. This directive establishes a permanent right of residence for long 
term immigrants and their families, after five years of legal residence, even if they no longer fulfill any of the 
conditions for which they were admitted within the EU (employment, studies, economic independence); it 
further allows for limited recourse to the host State’s social benefits during the first (5 year) period. 
64 Joined cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi & Carbonne [1984] ECR 377.  
65 The same conclusion was also reached by the Court in case C-159/90 SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685. 
In this case however, the Court avoided applying the relevant Treaty rules, as it was unable to identify any 
consideration for the services offered. 
66 See V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing national health and insurance systems but healing patients? The European 
market for health care services after the judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’, (2002) CML 
Rev, 683-729, and more recently ‘Health law and policy, the impact of the EU’, in G. De Burca (Ed.), EU Law 
and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity, EUI/OUP (2005), pp. 123-160. See also G. Davies, ‘Welfare as 
a service’, (2002) LIEI 27-40; P. Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the right to cross-border medical care’, 
(2004) ELRev, 673-685, and van der Mei, ‘Cross-border access to health care within the EU: Some reflections 
on Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Vanbraekel’, (2002) ML, 289-215 and ‘Cross-border access to medical 
care: Non-hospital care and waiting lists’, (2004) LIEI, 57-67. More recently see A. Dawes, ‘Bonjour Herr 
Doctor: national healthcare systems, the Internal Market and cross-border medical care within the EU’, (2006) 
LIEI, 167-182. For a full account of the relationships between EU and Health Law see T. Hervey and J. 
McHale, Health Law and the European Union, CUP (Cambridge, 2004). 
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however, that a patient from any member State moving abroad, may, next to urgent treatment 
provided by virtue of the European Insurance Card (ex document E 111):  
a) receive outpatient treatment67 in any other member State and obtain refund from their 
home State, at the tariffs applicable in this latter State; no prior authorisation is necessary for 
such a refund to be obtained, since the relevant right stems directly from Article 49 EC; 
b) receive any kind of treatment in other member States in the same conditions (tariffs, 
refund, indemnity etc – but for the duration) as patients of the host State, provided they have 
obtained prior authorisation (document E 112) by their home institution, according to Article 
22 of Regulation 1408/71; 
c) force the delivery of the above authorisation (for receiving treatment abroad) whenever the 
treatment objectively necessary for their medical condition 68 is not available in their home 
State or is not available within a reasonable waiting time, taking into consideration the specific 
needs of each particular patient;69 this is also a right directly stemming from Article 49 EC. 
These rights benefit all people insured with the competent institution of one member State, 
irrespectively of whether the home State70 a) operates a refund system, like the one followed 
(principally) in France, Germany and Luxembourg,71 b) operates a benefits-in-kind system by 
contracted in physicians and hospitals, as is the case in the Netherlands,72 or c) offers 
benefits-in-kind by essentially public institutions, as it is the case in the UK and Italy73.  
As a consequence of the above case law 74 mobility of patients across the EU countries is 
greatly facilitated. This, however, has not led up till now to opening the floodgates of 
‘peripatetic’ patients picking and choosing healthcare services in various member States.75 By 
facilitating the free movement of patients, the ECJ subjects the national/insurance health 
systems to indirect competition amongst them, hence pushing them to rationalize and 
promote efficiency. At a time where all the systems of social insurance in Europe go through a 
profound crisis – for economic, demographic, political and other reasons – this choice of the 
ECJ may prove particularly burdensome, at least in the short-term. However, from the 
viewpoint of the European citizen the case law of the Court may only be seen as a positive 
development. For, it ensures the right to health, anywhere within in the EC, without 
unjustifiable administrative or other burdens.  
 
4.3. Recognition of titles of study and experience  
 
Directly linked to the operation of the internal market is the issue of mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications. In this field too, the recent case law of the ECJ has proven 
particularly progressive. In a first generation of ‘foundational’ judgments,76 the ECJ 
established the obligation of member States to recognize the diplomas and professional 
experience acquired in another member State, by virtue of the Treaty provisions on free 
movement (articles 39, 41 and 49 EC). In its most recent case law the ECJ follows two 
directions: on one hand, it considerably extends the scope and enhances the effectiveness of 
the mutual recognition directives – mainly the General Systems –77 and, on the other hand, it 
insists on the parallel and complementary application of the rules of primary legislation.  
                                                          
67 Inpatient treatment has been restrictively defined, see Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I- 2641.  
68 For the objective assessment of the necessity of the treatment, independently from national preferences, 
see Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel, [2001] ECR I-5363.  
69 Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré, [2003] ECR I-4509 and Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325. 
70 The threefold classification which follows is simplistic, for the needs of demonstration, and does not account 
for the special characteristics of each one of the national systems. 
71 See Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR Ι-1931; Case C-56/01, Inizan, [2003] ECR I-12403; Case C-193/03, 
Bosch, [2004] ECR I-9911. 
72 Smits & Peerbooms, Vanbraekel et Müller-Fauré, all cited above. 
73 Watts, above. 
74 For a comprehensive presentation of the relevant case law and its implications for the organization of health 
services in the member states see V. Hatzopoulos, Health Law and Policy: the Impact of the EU, in G. de 
Burca, EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Collected Courses of the Academy of European 
Law) 2005, EUI/OUP. 
75 See T. Hervey & J. McHale Health Law and the EU CUP (2004) 143-144. 
76 Cases 71/76 Thieffry [1977] ECR 765, 115/78 Knoors [1979] ECR 399, 222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, 
Vlassopoulou [1991] ECR I-2357, C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663, C-319/92 Haim [1994] ECR I-425, C-
164/94 Aranitis [1996] ECR I-135.  
77 Directive 89/48/EEC (First General System) [1989] OJ L 19/16 and Directive 92/51/EC (Second General 
System) [1992] OJ L 209/25; now both repealed and replaced by Directive 2005/36 [2005] OJ 255/22. 
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4.3.1. The extensive application of the general systems  
 
At least three tendencies may be discerned in the way in which the ECJ interprets and applies 
the two general systems on mutual recognition.  
First, the ECJ proceeds in an increasingly extensive interpretation of the scope of application 
of the relevant directives. Therefore, in Bobadilla 78 the Court held that a collective labour 
agreement which fixes the terms of access to a specific employment in the public sector, may 
be assimilated to a ‘legislative, regulatory or administrative act’ in the sense of the first 
‘General System’ Directive 89/48, thus rendering the corresponding activity a ‘regulated 
profession’. The ECJ took a much bolder step in its judgment in Burbaud,79 where it held that 
Directive 89/48 applies to the French system of selection of high-level civil servants (in the 
field of health). The ECJ, held that any study period which leads to a particular profession, 
even if it forms part of a specific recruitment procedure and it does not lead to the attribution 
of any ‘degree’, has to be compared to similar study periods in other member states. In this 
way, the ECJ extends the scope of application of the General Systems to cover professional 
access not only in the private and public sector of other member States, but also in the 
provision of public service itself. Hence, the exceptions of Articles 39(4) and 45 EC allowing 
member States to restrict the access of non-nationals to employment in the public sector 
receive a qualified blow.  
This, together with the judgment of the Court in Beuttenmüller,80 concerning the recruitment 
conditions in the Austrian public education system, also illustrate the second general 
tendency of the ECJ’s case law in the field of professional qualifications, that is to say, the 
increasing invocation of the General Systems of recognition in the processes of recruitment in 
the public sector.  
Beuttenmüller also stands for the third tendency of the case law of the ECJ in relation to the 
General Systems, the recognition of their direct applicability. In this case, for the first time 
ever, the Court gave judgment on whether the operational provisions of Directives 89/48 and 
92/51 are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, so as to be directly applicable. The 
Court held that the provisions establishing the recognition obligation are directly effective. 
Most interestingly, the Court found that the provisions which allow member States to impose 
compensatory ‘integration’ measures (exams, training periods etc) cannot be relied upon by a 
state which has not yet/properly transposed the Directive. The same findings where 
reiterated, exclusively in relation to Directive 89/48, in the judgment of the Court in Peros81. In 
this way the Court dissociates two provisions, which were conceived as an indivisible whole 
(i.e. a right for individuals to have their qualifications recognized in other member States, 
tempered by a right for States to ensure minimal compliance with local professional practice). 
The criterion used is not the technically enforceable character of the provisions in question, 
but, rather, their addressees. The provisions having as their addressees individuals may be 
directly relied upon, while those giving rights to member States may not. This may be seen as 
a further application of the doctrine of estoppel.  
 
4.3.2. Complementary application of rules of primary law 
 
In order to cover possible lacunae, the ECJ considers the General Systems, as well as the 
sector-specific directives on recognition of professional qualifications to be specific 
expressions of the general Treaty rules. The ECJ constantly holds that ‘those judgments are 
merely the expression in judicial decisions of a principle inherent in the fundamental freedoms 
of the Treaty, and that the legal effect of that principle cannot be reduced as a result of the 
adoption of directives on mutual recognition of diplomas’.82 Hence, in Hocsman the Court held 
that the French medical association could not reject the application of a Spanish doctor, 
merely because he did not fall within the ambit of directive 93/16 on medical doctors.83 On the 
                                                          
78 Case C-234/97 Bobadilla [1999] ECR Ι-4773. 
79 Case C-285/01 Burbaud [2003] ECR I-8219.  
80 Case C-102/02 Beuttenmüller v. Land Württemberg [2004] ECR I-5405. 
81 Case C-141/04 Peros v. TEE [2005] ECR I-7163. 
82 Case C-31/00 Dreessen [2002] ECR I-663, recit. 25, where reference is also made to the earlier judgment in 
case C-238/98 Hocsman [2000] ECR I-6623, recits. 24 and 31.  
83 Directive 93/16/EC [1993] OJ L 165/1.  
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contrary, the medical association was under a duty, arising under the Treaty rules on free 
movement, to examine the substance of the applicant’s qualifications and to take into account 
the degree of similarity or equivalence to the qualifications required. Similarly, in Dreessen II, 
the Court held that the Belgian ‘Chamber of Architects’ could not reject registration of a 
Belgian who had studied in Germany, merely because he was outside the scope of Directive 
85/384 on architects.84 A similar solution was adopted more recently by the Court in 
Morgenbesser,85 in which a French law graduate sought to register as a trainee lawyer in Italy 
by virtue of the first General System. The Court found Directive 89/48 to be inapplicable but 
held that the Italian Bar Association had, nevertheless, to take into account the content of the 
applicant’s studies, as well as any experience acquired thereafter in the host state. 
The above case law of the Court should be seen in the light of two concomitant 
developments. First, the entire system of mutual recognition of professional qualifications has 
been reviewed, consolidated and extended by Directive 2005/36. On the other hand, in the 
run up to the creation of a ‘European research space’ and for the achievement of the Lisbon 
objectives, the Commission has already tabled the proposition to extend the system of mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications to third country nationals.86  
These developments offer a stark example of the interaction between the EC judiciary and 
legislature. This interaction is present not only in the field of mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications, but also in almost all the fields described above. Hence, next to the Court’s 
case law, the elimination of discrimination is also pursued by a series of recent legislative 
instruments: a) the citizenship Directive for European citizens and their families, b) the 2000 
Directives on non-discrimination, applicable to all resident in the EU irrespective of nationality 
87 and c) Directives 2003/86 on family reunification and 2003/109 on long-term residence, for 
third country nationals. Similarly, the mobility of patients in the EU is also a field in which the 
Commission is considering to take action.88  
The above social awakening of the ECJ and the legislator, has been an ongoing process, 
based on the internal market rules, citizenship and the Court’s creativity (activism, some will 
say). However, neither the Court nor the legislator could possibly intervene in fields where the 
EC has no competence. It has been described above why the EC has had essentially 
economic competences. Only after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, in 1992 and 
1997, respectively, did the EC acquire some proper powers in the social field. These powers, 
however, are of a limited scope and may only exceptionally serve as a basis for 
harmonization. Rather, the Community may only complement and coordinate national social 
policies.89  
 
5. Lisbon strategy and the Open Method of Coordination 
 
The first field in which the EC took action was employment policy, already in 1997, when it put 
into place the so called Luxembourg and Cologne ‘processes’ for the coordination of national 
employment policies. It was the Lisbon Agenda, however, in 2000 which put forward a more 
comprehensive social ambition at the European level.90  
 
5.1 The Lisbon objectives 
 
                                                          
84 Directive 85/384/EEC [1985] OJ L 223/15. 
85 Case C-313/01 Morgenbesser [2003] ECR I-13467.   
86 See the Green Book 2004/811 final, on the management of economic immigration, where the Commission 
faces i.a. means for integrating the foreign workforce into the EU labor market. 
87 For which see above 3.1. 
88 See the Report of the European Parliament A6-0173/2007 FINAL, of May 10, 2007, on the impact and 
consequences of the exclusion of health services from the Directive on services in the internal market, 
Rapporteur B. Vergnaud, para. 71, which calls the Commission to take all necessary actions to include 
healthcare in the ‘Services Directive’ 2006/123/EC. The ensuing resolution 2006/2275 (INI), of May, 2007, 
however, is more reserved as it only asks for a codification (possibly in the form of a communication) of the 
Court’s case law. 
89 It is true that already before the entry into force of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and the 
recognition, in favour of the EC, of competences in the social field, the EC had undertaken some sporadic 
actions in the social field; for health see T. Hervey, ‘The Legal Basis of EC Public Health Policy’, in. M. McKee 
et al. (eds.), The Impact of EU Law on Health Care Systems (2002), 23-55; in the field of education and 
vocational training programmes like Erasmus date as far back as 1987. 
90 See M. Daly, ‘EU Social Policy after Lisbon’ (2006) JCMS 461-481. 
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The Lisbon strategy, inaugurated in March 2000, has set the objective of making the 
European economy more knowledge-based and competitive. The main axes of this strategy 
are a) the acceleration of the overall EU growth rate and b) the increase of employment, c) 
under conditions of social cohesion and d) of respect of the environment. These objectives, 
broken down into numerous indicators and benchmarks, should, in theory, be achieved by 
2010. However, the mid-term progress evaluation effectuated by the 2005 spring European 
Council, took note of considerable delays in the achievement of the proposed goals and 
redefined the overall priorities of the strategy, while resisting any further reference to the 2010 
deadline.91 Moreover, the 2005 European Council defined a more efficient framework of 
governance for the Lisbon programme and confirmed its will to review the progress made 
every year in the spring European Council. 92 The achievement of the Lisbon objectives 
involves at least six distinct policy areas:93 a) the development of a knowledge-based society, 
where ample investment would be available for research and development (R&D), advanced 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) easily accessible and life-long 
education should be generally available; b) the completion of internal market (this time for 
real!), in particular in respect of the free provision of services; c) the setting up of an attractive 
business environment, through the reduction of red tape;94 d) the strengthening the labor 
market and ensuring social cohesion; e) high quality of environment and finally f) immigration 
policy will have to be adapted to the Lisbon objectives.   
Member States’ performance in all the above sectors has been broken down into indicators 
and is being evaluated on a yearly basis by the spring European Council. The choice of 
indicators has given rise to vivid controversy 95 and they have been regularly modified. Since 
2003 the Commission has adopted a system of concise presentation of the various indicators 
in 14 basic ‘structural indicators’.96 Among these, six are of an essentially social nature: a) 
employment rate, b) employment rate of older workers, c) public expenditure on education, d) 
at risk-of-poverty rate, e) long-term unemployment, f) dispersion of regional employment 
rates. Five structural indicators are economic in nature: a) GDP per capita, b) labor 
productivity, c) R&D expenditure, d) information technology expenditure, e) financial market 
integration. The remaining three indicators concern the environment: a) greenhouse gases 
emissions, b) energy intensity of the economy and c) volume of transport. 
 
5.2. The means for the achievement of the Lisbon objectives – the Open Methods of 
Coordination (OMCs) 
 
5.2.1 A brief presentation of the OMCs 
 
The main means for the achievement of the Lisbon objectives is the OMC. Although 
advertised as such (notably by the Lisbon European Council), this method is hardly new. 
First, it corresponds to practices followed by other regional or international fora of economic 
coordination, such as the OECD, the IMF, etc.97 Second, it is based both on earlier 
‘Processes’ (such as the ones initiated in Luxembourg and Cologne for the employment 
policy, or in Cardiff for the environmental policy) and on previous Commission initiatives, 
                                                          
91 See D. Gros, ‘Prospects of the Lisbon Strategy, How to Increase the Competitiveness of the European 
Economy’ (224/2005) CEPS working document, available at www.ceps.be .   
92 The attainment of the Lisbon objectives may be seen, from a neo-functional point of view, as the next big 
‘bet’ of the EU, nourishing and streamlining its integration process: after the completion of objectives such as 
the internal market (1992), EMU (1999), enlargement (2003-5) and in view of the unhappy fate of the 
Constitutional Treaty (due, to a large extent, to reasons of a social nature), the Lisbon strategy seems to be 
offering the necessary impetus for keeping the EU steaming ahead. That the Lisbon strategy is very high on 
the EU agenda, is clearly demonstrated by the fact that President Barroso has set up a Committee under his 
own leadership to coordinate the various policies involved. 
93 The five first fields of action follow roughly the presentation used in the Kok report, November 2004.  
94 For the precious experience already acquired and disseminated by the OECD in this field, see 
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_34141_1_1_1_1_37405,00.html. 
95 See among many, J. Arrowsmith, K. Sisson and P. Marginson, What can `Benchmarking' offer the Open 
Method of Coordination?  JEPP  (2004) 311-328,  C. de la Porte & Ph.  Pochet, Social Benchmarking, Policy 
Making and New Governance in the EU, JESP  (2001) 291-307.  
96 Communication of the 8-10-2003, COM 2003/585 final.  
97 See A. Schaefer, “A New Effective Form of Governance? Comparing the OMC to Multilateral Surveillance 
by the IMF and the OECD” (2004) paper available by the Max Plank Institute at www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de. 
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based on soft law, experience sharing, mutual learning, iterative evaluation of the policies 
pursued, etc.98 Third, and more fundamentally, it may be seen as a further transformation of 
the traditional ‘Community method’, furthering the 1985 ‘new approach’.99 Compared to the 
new approach,100 the OMC constitutes an even more flexible form of cooperation, based on 
commonly agreed indicators and/or benchmarks (not standards), which (like standards) allow 
for diversification and (again, like many standards) are not binding. This new ‘open’ method is 
also quite dependent on the industry and on experts (for the choice and formulation of 
indicators and benchmarks), but is more political and more intergovernmental, in the sense 
that the last word is given by the Council and the member States. Notwithstanding, the OMC 
should under no circumstance be seen as a rupture, but rather as yet another transformation 
of the way the EU functions. 
The OMC may be analysed as a multilevel process of governance, comprising at least four 
levels. First a) the European Council agrees on the general objectives to be achieved and 
offers general guidelines. Then, b) the Council of Ministers selects quantitative and/or 
qualitative indicators, for the evaluation of national practices. These indicators are selected 
upon a proposal by the Commission or by other independent bodies and agencies. Then 
follow c) the adoption of measures at the national or regional level (taking into consideration 
the local particularities) in view of the achievement of the set objectives and in pursuit of the 
indicators chosen. These are usually referred to as the ‘National Action Plans’ or NAPs. The 
process is completed with d) mutual evaluation and peer-review between member states 
(occasionally coupled with a system of naming and shaming/faming), at the Council level.  
Since its official launch, in 2000, the OMC has been used or, at least, proposed as a means 
of coordination between EU member States in various fields. According to the most recent 
account, by E. Szyszczak,101 thirteen (!) different OMCs may be said to be in place. She 
proposes a four-tier classification as follows: a) Developed areas (with a legal basis within the 
Treaty): Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and European Employment Strategy 
(EES); b) Adjunct areas: Modernisation of social protection, Social inclusion, Pensions, 
Healthcare; c) Nascent areas: Innovation and R&D, Education, Information Society, 
Environment, Immigration, Enterprise Policy; and d) Unacknowledged: tax. Each one of these 
OMCs differs from the others in several respects: duration of each cycle of coordination, kind 
of outcomes, degree of compliance pressure imposed upon the participating States, 
stakeholders involved, role of the participating institutions etc.  
These various OMCs have been classified from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’ by reference to three 
criteria: a) the degree of determinacy of the common guidelines, b) the possibility of sanctions 
and c) the degree of clarity regarding the roles of the various actors. Hence, it is accurate to 
state that ‘there seem to be as many types of OMCs as there are policy areas’.102 Therefore, 
the term OMCs, in the plural, more accurately depicts reality.  
Also, there is a temporal dimension in all OMCs: they seem to be fluid and ever-evolving, both 
the European and the national components of the process being subject to change from a 
cycle to the next. The 2005 ‘streamlining’ of the EES with the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelins (BEPGs) is the most striking illustration of the overarching fluidity characterizing 
OMCs.103 
                                                          
98 See D. Wincott, Beyond Social Regulation? New Instruments and/or a New Agenda for Social Policy at 
Lisbon? (2003) Public Administration 533-553 at 537. 
99 See V. Hatzopoulos, ‘A (More) Social Europe: A Political Crossroad or a Legal One-way? Dialogues 
Between Luxembourg and Lisbon’ (2005) CMLRev 1599-1635, 1630. 
100 Based on minimal harmonization (often through standardization) and mutual recognition, see Council 
Resolution of the 7 May 1985 for a new approach concerning technical harmonisation and standardisation 
[1985] OJ C 136/1. 
101 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination’ (2006) ELJ 486-502, at 494.  
102 S. Borràs & B. Greve in ‘Concluding Remarks: New Method or Just Cheap Talk?’ (2004) JEPP 329-336, 
330. See also J. Zeitlin, ‘The OMC in question’ in J Zeitlin and P Pochet (eds.), The Open Method of 
Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies (2005) P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 
Brussels e.a., 19-33, at 20-21. 
103 Following the 2005 spring European Council the above procedure is being further rationalized, streamlined 
and brought closer to the institutionalized coordination procedures provided for in the EC Treaty. Thus, two 
three-year cycles (2005-2008-2011) are set for the attainment of the agreed objectives. Each of the two cycles 
is initiated by a) a Strategic Report submitted by the Commission to the spring European Council, which leads 
the latter Institution to the adoption of b) Policy Guidelines concerning the economic, social and environmental 
objectives to be pursued. Following this, the Council will adopt a set of c) Integrated Guidelines, consisting of 
c1) the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) provided for in Article 99 EC and c2) the Employment 
Guidelines provided for in Article 128 EC. In this way these two, already existing, coordination instruments are 
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5.2.2. Pros and cons of the OMCs 
 
The OMCs have been a hot topic for EU scholars, both in political sciences and, to a lesser 
extent, law. Writers are divided over the virtues and the drawbacks of the OMCs. Since there 
is no single OMC but several and that none of them has been in place for more than ten years 
now, it is difficult to proceed to definitive assessment thereof.  
The main arguments in favour of the OMCs are as follows.104  
First, OMCs allow for diversification and flexibility. These characteristics are to be seen as 
virtues in a Community of 27, where divergences may not be bridged or brought together at 
once. Second, OMCs, like any other means of soft law, have lower contracting costs, 
because they lead to no binding obligations. Hence it is easier to ‘commit’ member States in 
new fields, even in areas where any common competence is absent. Moreover, hard law 
rules are not necessary in all fields of common action, and may even be counter-productive: 
their adoption is time-consuming and (often) adversarial, their content is often imprecise as a 
result of intense negotiation, the rules they fix tend to delay development and their 
implementation often proves problematic. Third, OMCs offer a credible alternative to 
command-and-control methods of regulation, which have been stretched to their limits. OMCs 
are knowledge-based, evolutive and all-accommodating. Therefore, they may be particularly 
useful as means of regulating broad policy fields, where no set objective or clear direction are 
present. In fields like these policy makers are better off with regulatory instruments which 
allow some flexibility coupled with space for ‘learning by doing’, instead of the traditional 
instruments which are power – rather than knowledge – based. Fourth, OMCs allow (in theory 
at least) for broader participation of interested parties, stakeholders and the civil society in 
general. This, in turn, could lead to a higher and cheaper degree of compliance.  
On the flip side, OMCs are questioned in at least four respects.105 First, their effectiveness is 
strongly put into doubt.106 Then, the argument goes, if their effects are non-existent or only 
indirect and uncertain, is it worth for the EU Institutions to invest their (extremely) limited and 
overburdened resources in running the OMCs? Second, the experimental generalisation of 
non-binding norms as a means of regulation the EU puts into stake the very foundations of 
the EU legal order and the ones which have made its success up till now: supremacy and 
direct effect. Moreover, the risk is present of gradually substituting soft norms to hard law, 
even in areas where proper regulation could have been possible and desirable. Third, the 
outcomes of OMCs are achieved through procedures which are not linear nor always 
transparent and it is very difficult – if not impossible – to identify their ‘author’. This, in turn, 
has at least two problematic consequences. Public access to the documents may not be 
secured, since every Institution may only give access to its own documents, not other 
Institutions’. More importantly, judicial control may be side-stepped, since it is very difficult to 
identify a specific ‘act’ which alters the plaintiff’s legal position, let alone issues of locus standi 
for non-privileged plaintiffs.107 Fourth, empirical research shows that participation in the 
various OMCs up till now has been extremely limited, if non-existent. Participation is deemed 
to make it up for the lack of representation, since the OMCs are essentially run by the 
executive power aided by experts, while parliaments have only limited and indirect say on the 
outcomes. This lack of participation puts into question the very legitimacy of the OMCs.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
combined in a more coherent way, with a clear precedence of the former over the latter.103 On the basis of 
these Integrated Guidelines member states shall draw up d) National Reform Programmes (NRPs) monitored 
by a national coordinator, while the Commission presents a e) Community Lisbon Programme, for the 
completion and the coordination of NRPs. Member states f) report yearly to the Commission on the progress 
achieved, and the Commission in turn proceeds to g) a global assessment, i) submitted for review by the 
European Council every spring. On the basis of this assessment the latter Institution may decide to review the 
Integrated Guidelines. 
104 This is a very brief and indicative enumeration of the advantages that may ensue from the OMCs, for more 
extensive developments see i.a. S. de la Rosa, ‘The OMC in the New Member States – The Perspectives for 
its Use as a Tool of Soft Law’ (2005) ELJ 618-640; D. Trubek & L. Trubek, ‘Hard and Soft Law in the 
Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the OMC’ (2005) ELJ 343-364. 
105 This is also a very brief overview of the criticisms of the OMCs; for more see V. Hatzopoulos ‘Why the 
Open Method of Coordination is bad for you: a letter to the EU’, (2007) ELJ 309-342. 
106 See the developments below 5.2.3. 
107  In this respect see J. Scott & S. Sturm, 'Courts as catalysts: rethinking the judicial role in new governance' 
(2007) Columbia JEL 565-594. 
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5.2.3. Effectiveness of the OMCs 
 
In a paper published in the autumn of 2005,108 K. Featherstone convincingly explained why 
‘soft’ coordination at the EU level failed to subjugate, or else affect, ‘hard’ politics in Greece. 
Hence, the proposed pension reform never took place, despite the fact that all the actors 
involved were in agreement as to the necessity (although not the terms) of such a reform. He 
observed that ‘instead of restructuring a bargaining game on distributional issues, affecting 
core interests, the EU stimulus was probably more evident at the cognitive level […] in terms 
of policy style’.109 Concomitantly, another London School of Economics originated paper, by 
M. Lodge, explored the impact of peer review and benchmarking, run under the auspices of 
the OECD, on regulatory innovation in participating States.110 He examined the ‘successful’ 
case of Ireland and compared it with the less successful ones of Spain and the UK. He found 
‘only limited evidence of such a process, whether by affecting change directly by prescription 
and recommendation or by voluntary compliance to international best practice’. ‘Policy 
transfer’ and ‘diffusion’ played only a minor role in this area of government activity. Despite 
the benchmarking and ‘comparative experience collection’ functions of the OECD, detailed 
evaluation of other States’ experiences was hardly evident.111 Finally, the processes that 
supposedly promote the use of ‘learning’ and ‘peer-group review’, were of limited value in 
promoting effective implementation of particular policy templates or even broad policy 
ideas’.112 These grim findings are firmly corroborated by the empirical ‘national reports’ on the 
effect of OMCs on employment and social inclusion policies in individual Member States, 
compiled by Zeitlin and Pochet.113 
The above pessimistic analysis, however, needs to be tempered in view of the findings of a 
different study by M. Lόpez-Santana.114 She looked into the EES and examined how the 
European guidelines have affected policymaking in three member states – Belgium, Sweden, 
and Spain. She acknowledged that ‘the effect of nonbinding instruments on domestic settings 
does not necessarily include changes in legal frameworks.’ She contended, however, that 
changes do occur in the policy process framework. Her argument is that ‘by acting as a 
framer of employment policy, the supranational level has restrained several dimensions of 
employment policy and labour market policies in the member states, mainly by: (a) defining 
(and reinforcing) what problems domestic policy-makers should attack to increase member 
state competitiveness, and to deal with internal and external challenges; (b) pointing out 
and/or reinforcing the idea that a policy line is good or bad and necessary; (c) restricting and 
limiting the policy options and courses of action that domestic policy-makers should develop; 
and (d) providing potential courses of action that allow policy-makers to ‘draw lessons’ and to 
‘learn’ about ways to solve or diminish the problem in question’.115 Hence, change does not 
                                                          
108  K. Featherstone, “‘Soft co-ordination meets ‘hard’ politics: the EU and pension reform in Greece” (2005) 
JEPP 733-750. 
109 Id 746-747. 
110 M. Lodge, ‘The importance of being modern: international benchmarking and national regulatory innovation’ 
(2005) JEPP 649-667. The extent to which the policy coordination taking place under the auspices of the 
OECD, on the one hand, and the EU OMC, on the other, are comparable is open to debate. Schafer above n. 
97 identifies important similarities. Lodge, himself in his paper draws important parallels between the two 
processes. On other hand A. Hemerijck and J. Visser, ‘Policy Learning in European Welfare States’, available 
at eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/hemerijckVisser2.pdf , compare the EES with the OECD Jobs Strategy and 
identify differences, the most important being that in the latter case indicators and best practices are ‘imposed’ 
by external technocratic experts rather than by national representatives. This author’s personal experience 
from participating in both the EU and OECD coordination exercises suggests that in both cases the indicators 
chosen are derived from the participating member’s practices. Also, to the extent that the OECD constitutes a 
much more ‘relaxed’ legal order than the EU and has only indirect means of enforcement, it is difficult to see 
how its officials could ever ‘impose’ their own views if they are not supported by national practice. 
111 This is a problem also identified in the EU OMC, as some authors speak of  a ‘beauty contest’, see S. 
Borràs & K. Jacobsson, ‘The OMC and new governance patterns in the EU’ (2004) JEPP 185-208 at 195. 
112  Lodge, at 662. 
113 J. Zeitlin and P.Pochet (eds.), The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and 
Social Inclusion Strategies (2005) P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Brussels e.a. 
114 M. Lόpez-Santana, ‘The Domestic Implications of European Soft Law: Framing and Transmitting Change in 
Employment Policy’ (2006) JEPP 481-499; this paper is part of a much wider research conducted by the 
author and presented as her Ph.D. Thesis at the University of Michigan (unpublished, 2006): ‘Soft 
Europeanization? The Influence of Europe in Employment Policies, Processes and Institutional Configurations 
in EU Member States’. 
115 Lόpez-Santana, 482. 
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occur in any spectacular way, but rather is related to transformations ‘in early stages of the 
decision-making process by those who are responsible for managing policy on a daily 
basis’.116 The EU framing effect manifests itself as it ‘expands the courses of action available 
to policy-makers by providing information and opening new spaces for coordination, while 
simultaneously restraining their options by framing good and bad policy’.117 At the end of her 
study, however, she acknowledges that ‘changes in the early stages of the policy-making 
process cannot guarantee success outcomes’.118  
Therefore, the OMC does have some effect on policy procedure, this effect being contingent 
upon several diversifying factors, such as the institutional and the ideational fit/misfit of the 
member State concerned by reference to the set objectives. It may also, with time and under 
propitious circumstances,119 lead to the transformation of newly induced policy objectives into 
some kind of norm.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The EU has been gradually building a social profile, despite the fact that the corresponding 
empowering provisions in the Treaty are quite limited. This profile has been pioneered by the 
Court, which has used the limited – and essentially ‘market making’ – provisions of primary 
and secondary legislation, in order to create secondary ‘market correcting’ principles. The 
legislator has followed suite, but only to the extent provided for by the Treaty provisions. In 
this respect, the concept of European citizenship together with the new powers conferred to 
the EU by the Treaties of Maastricht and of Amsterdam gave an important boost to the EU’s 
initiatives in this field. As some writer has put it, these events mark the passage from 
European ‘social law’ to European ‘social policy’. This move has been further pursued under 
the Lisbon strategy.  
Under the current economic and social conjecture, action of the EC in the social field is a one 
way road. In view of the limited powers that the EC posses in this field and the missed 
opportunity for more comprehensive competences provided for by the Constitutional Treaty, 
action in this field is likely to proceed by ‘new modes of governance’ and some kind(s) of 
OMC(s). In this way the EC should gradually adapt its ‘social model’ in order to cope with 
ageing populations, restricted public finances and globalised economies.  
With the profoundly divergent social systems of member States as starting points, it will be no 
easy task to face the above challenges with OMCs as the main regulatory means. In view of 
the inherent imperfections and deficiencies of the OMCs, it will be extremely difficult to 
respond to some fundamental questions, which may not yield to consensualism. Three 
questions at least will need to receive answers in the near future: a) which fields of social 
policy should be transferred at the European level, and to what extent? b) what social model 
should European social policy promote? And finally c) how should this model be put to work? 
These are highly political questions which may under no circumstances be answered by the 
Court. It is believed, however, that they may not be answered by soft coordination either, for 
at least two reasons. First, at the ideological level, if questions of this width are relegated to 
technocratic OMCs, then the role of politicians and politics will be annihilated. Second, at a 
more technical level, questions like the above may not be resolved through ‘the invisible hand’ 
of cyclical and periodical peer-reviews. Rather, they need a strong-hand to push them 
forward. Under the present institutional setting (of the ‘Reform Treaty’), however, such a hand 
is unlikely to emerge, unless the political conjecture changes dramatically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 Id 486. 
117 Ibid 494. 
118 Ibid 495. 
119 Notably if the OMC recommendations are in line with the national reform programme already in place, see 
in this respect, except from Lόpez-Santana (above n. 114) and Lodge (above n. 110), C. De la Porte ‘Is the 
OMC Appropriate for Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?’ (2002) ELJ 38-58 at 
50.  
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